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Land use changes to reduce non-point source pollution, such as nutrient runoff to 
waterways from agricultural production, incur opportunity costs that are privately known to 
landholders. Auctions may permit the regulator to identify those management changes that have 
greater environmental benefit and lower opportunity cost. This paper reports a testbed laboratory 
experiment in which landowner/sellers compete in sealed-offer auctions to obtain part of a fixed 
budget allocated by the regulator to subsidize pollution abatement. One treatment employs 
uniform price auction rules in which the price is set at the lowest price per unit of environmental 
benefits submitted by a seller who had all of her offers rejected. Another treatment employs 
discriminative price rules in which successful sellers receive their offer price. Our results 
indicate that subjects recognize the cost-revelation incentives of the uniform price auction, as a 
majority of offers are within 2 percent of cost. By contrast, a majority of offers in the 
discriminative price auction are at least 8 percent greater than cost. Nevertheless, the regulator 
spends more per unit of environmental benefit in the uniform price auction, and the 
discriminative price auction has superior overall market performance. 
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Auctions are commonly used to allocate scarce resources. Recent applications of 
economic theory and experimental economics to auction design have substantially improved the 
performance of auctions and have also helped to expand their applications to a broad range of 
problems. One area where auctions have attracted attention is in allocating resources to protect 
the environment. Many environmental problems stem from agricultural land management 
practices. These include rising salt and nutrient levels in rivers and bays, wetlands degradation, 
destruction of remnant vegetation and dryland salinity.  These pollution problems cause a decline 
in pasture and crop productivity, stunted growth and decreased plant yields. Extreme salinity can 
leave soil barren, for example, supporting only isolated patches of the most salt tolerant plants. 
Non-point sources in agriculture generate a substantial fraction of certain types of pollution, and 
it is difficult or prohibitively expensive to identify the amount and the source of many of these 
non-point emissions. Landowners have more information than regulators about their production 
plans and their costs of reducing pollution. An incentive mechanism like an auction is well suited 
to address this information asymmetry and encourage different landowners to reveal their private 
opportunity cost of land management changes. This could help the regulator to identify the land 
use options with greater environmental benefit but lower opportunity cost. 
  The theoretical advantages of auctions to mitigate environmental problems are well 
recognized (e.g., Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort, 1997). However, using auctions to solve 
environmental problems in practice requires more empirical research. In this paper we use 
experimental methods to examine two kinds of auction designs for “environmental 
procurement:” uniform price auctions and discriminative price auctions. Landowners offer 
projects that generate environmental improvement in these auctions. More specifically, sellers   2
offer projects with different costs and different levels of environmental benefits to the regulator, 
who is the buyer and ranks the offers on the basis of their offer price and the potential 
environmental improvement. The regulator allocates a fixed monetary budget to buy a maximum 
of one project from each seller. Each project is a specific land use change. All participants 
submit sealed offers, and in the uniform price auction the successful sellers receive a uniform 
price (per unit of environmental benefit) equal to the lowest rejected offer. In the discriminative 
price auction, each successful seller receives the actual price offered, rather than a single price 
common to all sellers.  
In the discriminative price design the sellers face uncertainty about acceptance, but not 
about price, since the price obtained from the regulator equals the offer if the offer is accepted. 
When contemplating raising her offer, a seller trades off the decreased probability of acceptance 
against a higher trading surplus conditional on acceptance. She has an incentive to misrepresent 
her costs and submit offers higher than her true reservation values, because otherwise she would 
earn no trading surplus.  
By contrast, in the uniform price auction all the successful sellers receive a market-
clearing price that exceeds their offer and is set by a seller who does not trade. In these auctions 
each seller has a greater incentive to reveal her true costs, since submitting an offer greater than 
the cost of a unit lowers the probability of selling that unit but does not raise the price at which 
the item might be sold. We find that offers are substantially closer to costs in the uniform price 
auction compared to the discriminative price auction. Nevertheless, for the experimental 
parameters we employ, the overall performance of the discriminative price auction is superior. 
  Formal analysis of these types of sealed bid auctions dates back to Vickrey (1961), who 
compared the incentives resulting from different auction procedures. He obtained a seminal   3
revenue equivalence theorem, which states that under the assumptions of bidder risk neutrality, 
independent private valuations, symmetry among buyers, single unit demand, payments a 
function of bids only and zero transaction costs incurred in bid creation and implementation, 
different auction formats yield the same expected revenue to the auctioneer. Much of the 
theoretical literature following Vickrey examines the robustness of this result to the introduction 
of alternative assumptions about buyers and sellers.
1 Empirical research comparing uniform and 
discriminative price auctions has used both field data and data from laboratory experiments. 
Kagel (1995) provides a survey of the early auction research. Smith (1982) reports the results of 
a number of experiments for multi-unit auctions in which the bidders submit single unit bids. The 
results neither support nor refute the revenue equivalence theorem. Cox et al. (1985) find that 
subjects failed to follow their dominant strategy of bidding equal to values in multiple unit, 
uniform price, sealed bid auctions. Cox et al. (1982) and Kagel et al. (1987) provide laboratory 
evidence that subjects respond strategically to the different incentives that alternative auction 
formats generate. Tenorio (1993) uses data from the Zambian foreign exchange auction to 
analyze the effects of a change in auction format from uniform price to discriminative price and 
finds that after controlling for other factors, the uniform price format yields higher average 
revenue than the discriminative price format. Umlauf (1993) reports similar results for auctions 
undertaken by the Mexican treasury.  
  Theoretical research on auctions cannot be directly applied to the auctions in this 
environmental application, however, because environmental goods and services violate many of 
                                                 
1 For example, Holt (1980) shows that for risk averse buyers, the discriminative auction results in higher expected 
revenue, and Maskin and Riley (2000) relax the assumption of symmetry and assume that the buyers’ reservation 
values are not identically distributed. In this case the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold and the ranking of 
different auctions would depend on how the distributions vary across buyers. Some researchers have argued that the 
uniform price auction has a lower winner’s curse in common value environments and results in greater revenue to 
the seller than would a discriminative auction (see Milgrom, 1989; Bikhchandani and Huang, 1993). However this 
work was based on a single-unit auction theory and Back and Zender (1993) show that this result is critically 
dependent on the assumption that the good was indivisible.    4
the assumptions for the revenue equivalence theorem. For example, the auctions studied here 
assume that sellers offer multiple projects for sale, but because of the interaction of the 
environmental benefits across projects the regulator would choose at most one project from each 
seller.
2 In this setting, sellers may not make optimal offers independently on each project. Instead 
they could infer that certain projects have a higher potential probability of winning and therefore 
they might focus their efforts on obtaining profits on these projects. Since they know that the 
regulator will purchase at most one project from each seller, they could make less aggressive 
offers on their other projects so as to avoid competing with themselves across projects. 
Moreover, the fixed budget constraint for the regulator implies that the number of projects 
accepted is endogenous. Hence our environment is not consistent with any particular existing 
theoretical model, and it is unlikely that any new tractable theory could capture these 
complications that arise in most relevant field applications. 
  Fortunately, in spite of these realistic complications it is feasible to compare the two 
auction institutions empirically even though a theoretical comparison is not practical. In our 
laboratory testbed we compare the behavior and performance of these two auction institutions in 
two different controlled environments. Our results show that laboratory subjects understand the 
cost revelation incentives of the uniform price auctions, with most submitted offers near the 
actual costs. By contrast, in the discriminative price auction almost all offers are greater than 
cost. For the parameters we employ, however, the discriminative price auctions result in more 
efficient environmental protection than the uniform price auctions. All three performance 
indicators show that the discriminative price design leads to significantly greater overall 
                                                 
2 For example, the installation of grassed swale drains with sediment traps to reduce nutrient loads would reduce the 
environmental benefit of decreased fertilizer applications. The benefits of these two alternative mitigation strategies 
are therefore interrelated, but the benefits would be evaluated separately in the auction for simplicity. To avoid the 
complication of project interactions we limit each seller to supply at most one project.   5
performance, even though the discriminative auction rules lead to higher offer prices. The 
empirical research issues examined in this paper are crucial to understand better how these 
environmental auctions might perform in the field. The experiments are based on parameters 
calibrated to field applications for actual environmental problems, so we think they can provide 
valuable guidance in economic settings like these where theoretical research cannot give clear 
predictions and hence is of limited use to make institutional comparisons.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design 
and Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes with a brief discussion of the findings. 
  
2. Experimental Design 
2.1  Environment and Procedures 
As discussed above, the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply in this environment, 
so it is possible that the relative efficiency and performance of the two auction institutions might 
be sensitive to the specific parameters chosen for the laboratory testbed. This potential parameter 
sensitivity is not uncommon in laboratory research, but it is more relevant here because we wish 
to strengthen the external validity of our results for potential field applications. We therefore 
employ parameters that correspond to two different non point source pollution problems: 
nitrogen reduction and salt reduction. The costs and environmental benefits are estimated 
specifically for these two environmental applications. In particular, in the nitrogen reduction 
environment, we employ cost and quality parameters representing the estimated opportunities for 
environmental improvement through land use change in the Port Phillip watershed, in southern 
Victoria, Australia (also see Cason, Gangadharan and Duke, 2003). All subjects have their costs 
and quality drawn from broadacre (field cropping) and grazing land uses, which are the activities   6
that represent the largest land use in the watershed (57 percent of the land) and contributes to 53 
percent of annual nitrogen pollution.  In the salinity reduction environment, the costs of salt 
management options and the associated environmental benefits were obtained from the 
Kamarook Catchment in Victoria, Australia (Hekmeijer et al., 2000). 
Subjects make offers based on different costs and qualities to represent the heterogeneity 
across different activities on the same land and between the same activities on different plots of 
land. We introduce heterogeneity by drawing costs and environmental quality for each land use 
change independently for each seller, each period, from the uniform distributions based on the 
ranges shown in Table 1.
3 We use the same sequence of drawn values in all the sessions to 
minimize across session variation and to improve the power of our comparison across auction 
institution treatments. Sellers know the costs of their land use change projects, but they do not 
know the associated quality (environmental benefit). We do not reveal the environmental 
benefits to sellers because a primary conclusion of Cason, Gangadharan and Duke (2003) was 
that this information led sellers to misrepresent their costs more for high-benefit projects, and 
this reduced total abatement and lowered other performance characteristics of the auction. In 
order to enhance the external validity of the experiment, we also do not provide sellers with any 
information about other sellers’ costs and quality or the distributions that are used to generate the 
costs and qualities. They are told simply that the costs and quality levels would be different 
across sellers and could change from period to period. They also do not know the regulator’s 
budget, which is fixed at $25,000 experimental dollars per period in the nitrogen reduction 
environment and $1000 experimental dollars per period in the salt reduction environment. 
                                                 
3 The benefit ranges shown in Table 1 represent the best available estimates given the soil type and topography of 
the Port Phillip watershed and the Kamarook Catchment. The cost ranges were developed through consultation with 
private landholders. For additional details on costs and benefits for nitrogen reduction, see Cason, Gangadharan and 
Duke (2003).   7
Subjects are informed that the experimenter purchases the lowest priced items per unit of quality, 
spending the fixed budget in each period. At the end of each auction period sellers only learned 
which item (if any) they sold and the price they received.  
Experimental subjects are undergraduate students from Purdue University and the 
University of Melbourne. All participated in only one session reported here and had no previous 
experience in sealed offer auctions. We report 30 sessions, 15 conducted at Melbourne (8 in the 
uniform price format and 7 in the discriminative price format) and 15 conducted at Purdue (7 in 
the uniform price format and 8 in the discriminative price format). All sessions have 36 trading 
periods. In each session eight seller subjects offer items in a computerized sealed offer auction, 
so across all 30 sessions a total of 240 different subjects participated. Each auction period sellers 
can offer to sell three items that correspond to different land use changes and have different 
environmental benefits. Sellers submit offers using an electronic form on a web browser. After 
all offers are submitted, the server sorts the offers and ranks them on the basis of the offer price 
and the quality of the items (quality is the environmental benefit) and calculates the allocation 
for the period. The auctioneer buys the lowest-price projects per unit of quality, subject to the 
constraint that at most one item is bought from each seller and total auction expenditures are no 
greater than the auction budget. The two auction institutions differ only in how they determine 
trading prices; see Table 2 below for a specific example. Once the allocation is made the results 
are reported to the subjects electronically on their web browser.  
As is usual in experimental economics, we use neutral terminology in the instructions to 
refer to the different items that sellers could offer. The appendix contains the experiment 
instructions. Subjects are asked to record the profits made in each of the 36 periods in their 
record sheets and they are paid privately in cash after the experiment. The conversion rate used   8
in the nitrogen reduction environment for the Purdue sessions was 1000 experimental dollars = 1 
U.S. dollar and the conversion rate used in Melbourne was 600 experimental dollars = 1 
Australian dollar. For the salinity reduction sessions the corresponding conversion rates were 15 
experimental dollars = 1 U.S. dollar and 12 experimental dollars = 1 Australian dollar. Sessions 
typically lasted 60 to 90 minutes, including the instruction time. Average subject earnings were 
about US$23 each in the Purdue sessions and A$30 each in the Melbourne sessions.  
2.2  Treatments and Predictions 
  Our goal in this experiment is to compare the performance characteristics of uniform 
price and discriminative price auctions. In the uniform price treatment if sellers sell an item they 
receive a price that is greater than or equal to their offer price. The uniform price in the market is 
determined by the lowest price per unit of quality submitted by a seller who had all of his or her 
offers rejected. In the discriminative price treatment sellers receive their exact offer price when 
they sell an item. Both auctions employ the greedy algorithm that finds the best local solution by 
accepting the items that have the lowest price per unit of quality, subject to the other constraints 
that (1) no more than one item is purchased from each seller and that (2) total expenditures do 
not exceed the overall auction budget.
4 
  Table 2 presents an example from period 31 in two sessions to illustrate the rules. In both 
auction formats the algorithm first calculates ratio of the offer price to the environmental benefit 
for each project, and then prioritizes projects according to this ratio from lowest to highest. The 
top panel of Table 2 shows this ranking and allocation for a discriminative price session. The 
first and second projects in this ranking are sold, but the third is not because the algorithm 
already bought a project from seller 5. The auction only purchases five projects because the 
                                                 
4 We could have implemented a more complex algorithm that is more likely to find the globally optimal solution, 
but at the cost of not being able to explain the auction purchase rule to sellers. We chose this simple algorithm since 
our goal is to study auction rules that could be implemented in the field with a reasonable level of transparency.   9
cumulative cost is $24,505 and no additional projects can be purchased with the $495 remaining 
in the auction budget. The bottom panel of Table 2 shows results in a uniform price session. 
Again, only five projects are sold. All are sold at the offer/benefit ratio of a seller (7) who 
submitted the lowest ratio (49.33) but had all of her offers rejected. For example, instead of his 
red-unit offer of 2999, seller 1 received 49.33 times his environmental benefit (124.46) = $6,140 
for this project. Total auction expenditures are $23,073 this period. 
  The standard revenue equivalence results do not apply in these auctions since sellers have 
multiple items to offer, they do not observe the quantity of environmental benefits for their 
items, the number of items purchased is endogenous since it is based on an overall auction 
budget, not to mention other practical reasons equivalence results often do not apply such as risk 
aversion and bounded rationality. Our focus is therefore not on comparing the outcomes of these 
auctions to theoretical predictions, but we can nevertheless compare the relative empirical 
performance of the two auction institutions for different environmental management 
applications. Still, it is useful to have some theoretical benchmarks based on simplifying 
assumptions to motivate the institutional comparison. 
  The most reasonable benchmark for the uniform price auction is full revelation: 
offer=cost. In this type of “first-rejected-offer” uniform price auction sellers usually have a 
dominant strategy to offer their projects at cost. This is because submitting an offer below cost 
would only increase the probability of acceptance if the price received falls below cost, and 
submitting an offer above cost is very unlikely to raise the price.
5 For the auction budgets and the 
                                                 
5 An offer above cost could occasionally raise price in our setting because sellers’ different projects have different 
environmental benefits and the auction has a monetary budget constraint. It is therefore possible to construct 
examples in which a seller could raise the offer price on one of her items above cost and have a different (higher 
environmental benefit) item accepted, which would in turn exclude different rivals’ items and raise the uniform 
cutoff price. Sellers do not observe their projects’ environmental benefits, nor do they observe the offers or costs of 
their rivals; therefore, the incomplete information setting of our experiment—chosen to reflect reasonable   10
actual realized costs and environmental benefits draws employed in the experiment, under full 
cost revelation these uniform price auction rules extract 72.4 percent of the maximum possible 
abatement in the nitrogen reduction environment and 86.6 percent of the maximum possible 
abatement in the salinity reduction environment. 
  Sellers’ costs are distributed independently in this laboratory environment, so 
independent private value auction theory for multiple-unit discriminative price auctions provides 
a benchmark approximation in the discriminative price auction treatment. Since sellers receive 
the price they offer, they clearly have an incentive to offer prices above costs. How much above 
costs they should offer depends on the number of sellers in the auction and the number of units 
accepted by the auctioneer. Our experiments employed N=8 sellers, and the sellers could infer 
over time from the rate that they successfully sold that typically the auctioneer purchased Q=5 
units each period in the nitrogen environment, or Q=5 or Q=6 units each period in the salinity 
reduction environment.
6 If, as a first approximation, sellers behave as if they know Q and that it 
is stable, and they prepare offers on each of their three units independently, we can estimate how 
much they will offer above cost based on standard results from Vickrey auctions (see, e.g., Cox, 
Smith and Walker, (1984), for the relevant formula). As shown below in Figure 1, the 
equilibrium offer function under these simplifying assumptions is nonlinear and substantially 
exceeds cost for low cost draws. For our parameters the equilibrium offers for the low-range cost 
draws are two or three times higher than cost based on this approximation. Consequently, for the 
actual realized cost and environmental benefits draws employed in the experiment, in the 
nitrogen reduction environment these discriminative price auction rules extract only 54.8 percent 
                                                                                                                                                             
incomplete information in any field implementation—makes the identification of this misrepresentation incentive 
rather implausible. 
6 In the nitrogen reduction environment, exactly Q=5 units were sold in 64 percent of the periods, and the Q sold 
was 4, 5 or 6 in 99 percent of the periods. In the salinity reduction environment, Q=4 in 6.2% of the periods, Q=5 in 
42.1% of the periods and Q=6 in 51.7% of the periods.   11
of the maximum possible abatement if this offer function approximation is accurate. The 
corresponding benchmark for the salinity reduction environment is 63 percent of the maximum 
possible abatement for both the Q=5 and Q=6 approximations. These benchmarks are 
substantially below the benchmark prediction for the uniform price auction (72.4 percent and 
86.6 percent respectively for nitrogen and salinity as noted above), so we expect that uniform 




  Figures 1 and 2 present an overview of the offer data for the nitrogen reduction 
environment.
7 Figure 1 indicates that nearly all offers (99%) exceed cost as expected in the 
discriminative price auction. Most offers (73%) lie in a band between cost and cost+$1000, and 
45% are within $500 of cost. The offer data for the salinity reduction environment are similar; 
99.6% of the offers exceed costs and most offers (89%) lie in a band between cost and cost+$28, 
and 58% are within $14 of cost.  Figure 2 shows that offers are dramatically different in the 
uniform price auction. The scatterplot of offers is more centered on the offer=cost reference line 
(indeed, the offer dots practically obscure this line). While there is some variation in offers 
relative to costs and nearly two-thirds (64%) of the offers are above cost, 80% of the offers are 
within $500 of cost. Similarly for the salinity reduction environment, nearly two thirds (67%) of 
the offers are above cost and 85% of the offers are within $14 of cost. In the first subsection we 
                                                 
7 This figure, and all the analysis that follows in this section, excludes a small number of offers that were obvious 
typographical errors. These occurred when sellers accidentally left a digit off of their offer, such as making an offer 
of 1,030 with a cost of 9,250 in the discriminative price treatment. This seller clearly intended a different offer (such 
as 10,300) since the offer of 1,030 virtually guarantees her a loss of 8,220, and this occurred in period 35 when this 
seller had plenty of experience. We excluded a total of 27 such typographical errors, out of 25,896 offers submitted 
(0.10%). We also lost all 24 offers from one period in one uniform price session due to a data recording error.   12
summarize the impact of the auction rules and these offers on overall market performance, 
before we return to analyze the offer behavior in more detail in Subsection 3.2. 
3.1  Overall Market Performance 
Following Cason et al. (2003), we compare the auction formats using three market 
performance measures. These measures differ from the standard allocative efficiency measures 
typically applied in laboratory auction research. For the auction to be allocatively efficient, it 
must select the least costly projects. But in this policy application, to improve efficiency the 
auction also needs to select projects with high environmental benefits (quality). The first market 
performance measure, called P-MAR (for the Percentage of Maximum Abatement Realized), is 
the amount of pollution abatement realized by the auction mechanism, as a percentage of the 
highest amount of abatement that could be achieved with the government’s auction budget. This 
maximum is based on the realized cost and benefit draws each period. This maximum abatement 
target could be achieved, for example, if the government knew both the cost and quality of each 
project and could implement its selected projects at their cost.
8  
Figure 3 shows that average P-MAR is greater in the discriminative price auction than in 
the uniform price auction in all 36 periods of the nitrogen reduction environment and in 31 of 36 
periods in the salinity environment. The left side of Table 3 presents P-MAR averaged across 
                                                 
8 Sometimes this maximum abatement would occur in the discriminative price auction if all sellers offer their 
projects in the auction at cost. Cost-revealing seller behavior does not always result in maximum abatement, 
however. The auction ranks the offers on the basis of their offer/quality ratio, and selects those with the lowest 
ratios. This greedy algorithm does not always result in the maximum abatement achievable for a fixed budget, due to 
the discrete set of projects acceptable in any auction period. Some higher abatement projects could be excluded from 
the auction allocation due to a cost that exceeds the fixed budget, while higher offer/quality ranking projects are 
accepted because of their lower overall cost. Consequently, some rearrangement of the selected projects can 
sometimes modestly increase the total abatement realized. To determine the selected projects that maximize 
pollution abatement, we calculated the total abatement for the 4
8=65,536 possible project combinations each period, 
and determined the greatest abatement among all the affordable project combinations. If all sellers offered their 
projects at cost, then the discriminative price auction selects the combination of projects that maximize abatement in 
12 of the 36 periods in the nitrogen reduction environment and in 6 of the 36 periods in the salinity reduction 
environment. In 28 of the 36 periods for the nitrogen environment and in 19 of the 36 periods for the salinity 
environment, full cost revelation achieves at least 95 percent of the maximum possible abatement.   13
periods, separately for each session. The lowest efficiency across the 10 discriminative price 
sessions (80.8%) is greater than the highest efficiency across the 10 uniform price sessions 
(74.2%) in the nitrogen reduction environment, so a nonparametric Wilcoxon test based on one 
(statistically independent) observation per session strongly rejects the hypothesis of equal 
efficiencies (p-value=0.0014). Similarly for the salinity reduction environment, the lowest 
efficiency across the 5 discriminative price sessions (88.3%) is greater than the highest efficiency 
in the uniform price treatment (85.4%) so the Wilcoxon test rejects the hypothesis of equal 
efficiencies (p-value=0.03). 
The regression shown in the first column of Table 4 presents additional parametric 
evidence that controls for other factors such as experience (time period) and subject pool. These 
panel regressions are based on a random effects error structure, with the session representing the 
random effect, in order to account for the correlation of market outcomes within a session. We 
include a dummy variable for the experiment site to account for any cultural or demographic 
differences across subjects. We also include ln(period) to allow the model to capture differences 
in performance across periods. The negative and highly significant estimate on the uniform price 
treatment dummy variable indicates that P-MAR efficiency is about 15 percentage points lower 
in the uniform price auction than in the discriminative price auction in the nitrogen reduction 
environment. The difference between the pricing rules leads to a smaller difference in 
performance for the salinity reduction environment, but the pricing rule is still statistically highly 
significant. Although Figure 3 does not indicate any pronounced trend over time, the positive and 
significant ln(period) term indicates that performance improves modestly across periods in both 
environments.   14
  The second market performance measure provides an alternative summary of the 
auctions’ ability to obtain the most abatement for the auction budget. We use P-OCER (for the 
Percentage of Optimal Cost-Effectiveness Realized) to refer to the actual quantity of abatement 
per dollar spent in the auction, as a percentage of the quantity of abatement per dollar spent in 
the “maximal abatement” solution to this problem described above. It differs from P-MAR 
because different amounts are spent in this auction since the auction selects a discrete set of 
projects. Presumably the unspent resources have some alternative value, so a reasonable 
objective is to maximize the abatement per dollar.  
  Figure 4 and the middle of Table 3 show that P-OCER, like P-MAR, is uniformly higher 
in the discriminative price auction than in the uniform price auction (Wilcoxon p-value=0.0014 
in the nitrogen reduction environment and 0.03 in the salt reduction environment). The 
regression in the second column of Table 4 indicates that P-OCER efficiency is on average about 
11 percentage points higher in the discriminative price auction in the nitrogen reduction 
environment and 3 percentage points higher in the salinity reduction environment. The positive 
and significant ln(period) term indicates that like P-MAR, P-OCER increases across time. 
  The third performance measure is seller profits. Seller profits represent money “left on 
the table” that the government “overspends,” relative to the actual cost of implementing the land 
use changes. Therefore, lower seller profits are better from the government’s perspective.  
  Figure 5 shows that sellers almost always earn higher profits on average in the uniform 
price auction, and in some periods their earnings are dramatically higher—even double the 
profits of the discriminative price auction. The right side of Table 3 shows that similar to the 
efficiency calculations, in the nitrogen reduction environment the highest average seller profits in 
the discriminative price auction (4840) is less than the lowest seller profits in the uniform price   15
auction (5467), so the Wilcoxon test also strongly rejects the hypothesis of equal seller profits 
across auction treatments (p-value=0.0014). Similarly for the salinity reduction environment, the 
highest average seller profits in the discriminative price auction (68.7) is less than the lowest 
seller profits in the uniform price auction (78.2) and the Wilcoxon test rejects the hypothesis of 
equal seller profits across treatments (p-value=0.03). The seller profits regression model in the 
third column of Table 4 also mirrors those of the abatement efficiency models. Seller profits are 
significantly higher in the uniform price auction, by over 3,000 experimental dollars per period 
on average in the nitrogen reduction environment and by nearly 29 experimental dollars in the 
salinity reduction environment. These average differences in profits across auction institutions 
represent approximately 80 percent and 20 percent of the cost of the median accepted offer in the 
nitrogen and the salinity reduction environments, respectively. Overall, the results in Figures 3 
through 5 and Tables 3 and 4 indicate that market performance is lower in the uniform price 
auction.  
3.2  Offer Behavior 
In this section we examine the individual offers made by sellers by estimating empirical 
offer functions that relate offers to cost draws. First, however, recall that our design employed 
the same set of cost draws across all 20 sessions in the nitrogen reduction environment and 
across all 10 sessions in the salinity reduction environment i.e., we use the same set of 8 sellers × 
3 items × 36 periods = 864 cost draws in each session, with separate draws of course for the 
nitrogen and salinity environments. Thus, we can pair the same cost draws for each of the 10 
pairs of sessions in the nitrogen reduction environment and in each of the 5 pairs of sessions in 
the salinity reduction application and compare the corresponding offers across auction 
treatments. This simple and direct comparison between the offers indicates that offers are on   16
average 572 experimental dollars higher in the discriminative price session (standard error of the 
mean = 43) for the nitrogen reduction environment and 14.3 experimental dollars higher in the 
discriminative price session (standard error of the mean = 0.59) for the salinity reduction 
environment. The average number of units bought by the regulator in the uniform price sessions 
is lower than in the discriminative price sessions, but the difference is statistically significant 
only for the nitrogen reduction environment. The median variance of offers is also higher in the 
uniform price sessions, however the difference is not statistically significant in either 
environment.  
Table 5 presents random effects regressions of seller offer functions separately for the 
two auction treatments. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the discriminative price treatment 
and column 3 presents the estimates for the uniform price treatment. The dependent variable is 
the seller’s offer price, and the explanatory variables include costs faced by sellers for the 
different projects, a dummy variable for the site of the experiment, and time (the natural 
logarithm of the period number). We report both linear and nonlinear specifications for the 
discriminative price treatment, since the theoretical approximation in Figure 1 suggests a 
nonlinear specification for this institution.
9 Note, however, that the nonlinear term (costs
2) is not 
significantly different from zero for either environment. 
The results show that there is a strong positive relationship between the project cost and 
the offers in both the uniform and discriminative price treatments. In fact, the coefficient on the 
cost variable is not significantly different from one for either auction format in either 
environment, indicating a similar one-to-one relationship between costs and offers in both 
treatments. These estimated offer functions instead differ in their intercepts. In the nitrogen 
                                                 
9 In particular, the theoretical approximation shown in Figure 1 for the nitrogen reduction environment is fit very 
accurately with the quadratic specification Offer = 7573 – 0.429Cost + 0.000067Cost
2.   17
reduction environment, the intercept in the uniform price auction is not significantly different 
from zero, so combined with the cost coefficient not different from one these estimates support 
the conclusion that sellers on average made offers equal to cost. That is, sellers’ behavior on 
average is consistent with the revelation incentives for this auction institution discussed at the 
end of Section 2. By contrast, the intercept in the discriminative price auction is significantly 
greater than zero. The estimate indicates that offers were on average at least 1,000 experimental 
dollars above cost. For the salinity reduction environment, the offer function intercept is 
significantly positive for both uniform and discriminatory price sessions; however, offers 
increase over time in the discriminatory price sessions while they decline over time in the 
uniform price sessions. In the uniform price treatment this substantial time trend cancels out the 
positive intercept by period 16.   
Figure 1 displays a quadratic offer function fit through all the offers in the discriminatory 
price treatment, and it shows that on average the relationship between offers and costs is 
approximately linear. More importantly, this figure illustrates that sellers of low-cost projects in 
this incomplete information environment did not overstate their costs when submitting offers 
nearly as much as predicted by our benchmark approximation indicated on the figure. These low-
cost projects are particularly important for the overall efficiency and abatement realized in the 
auction, since they are most likely to be accepted by the auctioneer. Sellers offered these projects 
at prices closer to costs than we predicted, which is why the discriminative price auction 
performed better than the uniform price auction.  
The other reason for the performance difference is that the quantity of projects accepted 
in the two auctions is significantly different. Figure 6 shows that the median prices paid per 
project are higher in the uniform price treatment than in the discriminative price treatment even   18
though the median offers submitted by the sellers and the median accepted offers are lower in the 
uniform price sessions. This implies that the buyer operating with a fixed budget can buy more 
environmental projects on average in the discriminative price auction and this in turn leads to 
lower efficiency in the uniform price sessions. For example, in the nitrogen reduction 
environment 4.15 projects were bought on average in each uniform price auction, compared to 
5.06 projects on average in each discriminative price auction. 
  
4.   Discussion 
Auctions allow an environmental regulator and  landholders to use information about 
environmental benefits and land use management costs to help protect the environment. In the 
auctions testbedded here the agency uses public resources to subsidize land use changes that aim 
to reduce pollution. It is important therefore to ensure that the agency’s environmental budget is 
well spent, and this is where the details for the actual design of the auction become critical. 
The laboratory auctions reported in this paper compare uniform price allocation rules 
with discriminative price rules. The experiment makes this comparison in two different 
environmental applications—nitrogen reduction and salinity reduction. The offer function 
estimates indicate that offers were not significantly different from costs in the uniform price 
treatment, so sellers on average made offers in this auction format that were consistent with the 
cost-revelation incentives of this institution. Nevertheless, this auction format does not achieve 
full efficiency, since the uniform price was set by the first rejected seller’s offer, and all 
successful sellers received this price per unit of quality. Since successful sellers receive prices 
that exceed their offers and offers were approximately equal to costs, prices exceed costs and 
some inefficiency occurred.   19
The offer function estimates indicate that offers substantially exceed costs in the 
discriminative price treatment, and that each increase in costs by one dollar is matched with an 
increase in the offer by one dollar. Prices are set equal to offers, so submitting offers above costs 
is the only way that sellers can earn positive profits in this auction institution. This auction is also 
not fully efficient, but the results indicate that the inefficiency and the amount sellers are 
“overpaid” relative to their project costs is lower in the discriminative price auction than the 
uniform price auction. This occurred because sellers did not “mark up” offers above cost as 
much as suggested by an approximation based on multi-unit discriminative auction theory. In 
addition, the first rejected seller rule for setting the price in the uniform price auction leads to 
higher prices paid per project than in the discriminative price sessions, which in turn reduces the 
number of projects the environmental regulator can buy in the uniform price auction. This has an 
impact on reducing efficiency in the uniform price sessions. 
It is important to emphasize that these conclusions are based on particular 
parameterizations of project costs, land uses and potential environmental benefits. We chose 
these parameters carefully to approximate the conditions for two specific environmental 
problems being considered for land use change auctions, but these conclusions may not hold in 
other situations. For example, intuition from auction theory suggests that the degree to which 
sellers submit offers above cost in the discriminative price auction should depend on the number 
of sellers (N) relative to the number of items purchased (Q). Therefore, it is important to 
determine whether the ordering clearly established in this initial experiment continues to hold in 
other settings that approximate non-point source pollution in other regions and land uses. We 
should also emphasize that these laboratory testbed experiments represent only the first step in 
the long process from auction design to field implementation. For example, it will be useful to   20
conduct experiments with actual landholders, using the environmental terminology—and the 
relevant value judgments that environmental protection and property rights evoke in this 
population. The preferred auction design can then be evaluated in small-scale field experiments 
with landholders, implementing actual land use changes. The results reported here suggest that 
uniform price auction rules may not perform better than discriminative price rules, even though 
they have better cost-revelation incentives.   21
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Appendix: Instructions for Uniform Price Auction Treatment (Discriminative Price 
Auction instructions are similar) 
General 
  This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  The instructions are simple 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you will earn money that will be paid 
to you privately in cash. All earnings on your computer screens are in Experimental Dollars. 
These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a 
rate of             Experimental Dollars = 1 real Dollar. The important thing to remember is that the 
more experimental dollars you earn, the more real dollars that you take home at the end of the 
experiment. 
  We are going to conduct a set of auctions in which you will be a seller in a sequence of 
periods. During each auction period you will sell up to one item. You have up to three types of 
items to sell, called Blue, Red and Yellow items. These items have different levels of “quality” 
that are valued differently by the experimenter, who is the buyer. Your quality levels may change 
from period to period, and they may be different from the quality levels of other participants. 
You can sell only one item per period, and if you sell that item then you must pay that item’s 
cost. If you do not sell any item in a period then your earnings are zero for that period. Notice 
that you do not pay an item’s cost unless you sell that item. Your costs may also change from 
period to period, and they may be different from the costs of other participants. 
  Your costs for each of the three types of items are displayed on your computer screen 
each period, as shown in the example figure on the next page. The profits from sales (which are 
yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the sale price of an item and the 
cost of that item. (How price is determined will be explained shortly.) That is,   24
[your earnings = (sale price of item) – (cost of item)]. 
  Suppose, for example, that the cost for your Blue item is 110.  If you sell your Blue item 
at a price of 160, your earnings are: 
Earnings = 160 – 110 = 50 
Notice that if you sell an item for a price that is less than its cost, then you lose money on that 
sale. 
 
How Your Price is Determined 
  The price you receive if you sell an item and which (if any) item you sell is determined 
using a “sealed offer” auction. In each period you submit an “offer sheet” through your web 
browser, which lists the minimum amount that you wish to receive for each item. [Do not use a   25
dollar sign when entering your offers on your web browser.] If you sell an item, you will receive 
a price that is greater than or equal to the price you indicated on your offer sheet for that item.  
  After everyone submits their offer sheets, the experimenter’s computer then ranks the 
offers on the basis of the offer price and the quality of the items. The experimenter purchases the 
lowest priced items per unit of quality, spending all of the fixed and constant (and unknown to 
you) “budget” that is available in the auction.  (In the case of a “tie,” where two or more items 
are offered at the same per-quality-unit price but the experimenter cannot purchase them all, the 
computer randomly determines which item or items are purchased.) Sometimes you may sell an 
item that you offer at a higher price than some other item when that item has a higher quality. 
Sometimes you may not sell any item. Remember, the experimenter will buy no more than one 
item from each seller. 
  The price you receive if you sell an item is NOT determined by any of the offers you 
submit. Instead, everyone who sells an item in a period receives the same price per unit of 
quality, and this price is set by the lowest price per unit of quality submitted by a seller who had 
all of his or her offers REJECTED. Thus, your profit is not decreased by submitting offers lower 
than the lowest rejected offer that determines the price. The lower your offers the more likely 
you will have an offer below the lowest rejected offer and therefore make a successful sale.  
In other words, by submitting lower offers you increase the likelihood that you make a 
sale, but lower offers do not directly reduce the price you receive since the price you receive is 
determined by a different (rejected) seller’s offer. As long as you make offers that are no lower 
than your items’ costs, you have no chance of losing money because if you sell an item you 
receive a price that is at least as high as your offer price. But if you make offers that are lower 
than your costs you run the risk of selling at a price less than your cost. This is because the   26
lowest rejected offer could then also be less than your cost and result in a price for you that is 
less than your cost. 
 
After each auction period, the experimenter will tell you when to click the “Continue” 
button to display the auction results. An example results screen is shown above. It indicates 
which (if any) item you sell by a “yes” in the Sold column. The results screen also displays the 
price you receive and the profit on the sale. Circle the color of the one item (if any) that is 
accepted in the column (1) of your Personal Record Sheet. Then enter the cost of this item, your 
offer price, the price you receive for the item, and your profit in the other columns of the record 
sheet. Use a calculator to keep track of your total (cumulative) Experimental Dollar earnings in 
the rightmost column (6) of your Record Sheet. The results page will automatically increment 
the period number by 1 for the next period, so after you write down your results on your Record 
Sheet you should simply press Continue to move to the next period.   27
Summary 
•  Seller earnings on a sold item = sale price of item – cost of item 
•  Sellers have three types of items, which can have different costs and quality levels valued 
differently by the experimenter (who is the buyer). Your costs are shown on your computer 
screen each period.  
•  Costs and quality levels may change from period to period and vary across sellers. 
•  Sellers submit offer prices for three types of items, but the experimenter will buy no more 
than one item from each seller. 
•  The experimenter purchases the lowest price items per unit of quality, and spends a constant 
budget in every auction. 
•  If you sell an item the price you receive is determined by the lowest price per unit of quality 
offered by a seller who has all of his or her offers rejected in the auction. 
Are there any questions now before we begin the experiment?   28













for Sold Item 
(column 4) 
Profit this Period 





1  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
2  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
3  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
4  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
5  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
6  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
7  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
8  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
9  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
10  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
11  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
12  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
       29
Table 1:Cost and Environmental Benefit Quality: Parameters 
Note: Each of the eight sellers drew costs and benefits for three land use or management 
changes, one from each of the three categories indicated below. For the nitrogen reduction 
sessions, these costs and benefits were scaled up to correspond to 150 ha in land area per seller. 
We did not scale up the values for the salinity reduction sessions. 
 
Panel A: Nitrogen Reduction 
Land Use or Management Change  Cost Range  Nitrogen Reduction Range 
Filter/Buffer Strips  $15-65 per ha/year  0.35-0.875 kg/ha/year 
Stabilize Soil Erosion  $15-65 per ha/year  0.28-1.05 kg/ha/year 
Best Management Practices  $17.5-65 per ha/year  0.35-0.70 kg/ha/year 
Sources: Argent, R.M. and Mitchell, V.G. (1998) FILTER: A Nutrient Management Program for the Port Phillip 
Catchment. Centre for Environmental Applied Hydrology, The University of Melbourne. 
Documentation of “Best Management Practices” for Nutrient Reduction and Management in Dryland and Irrigated 
Agriculture, a report by Rendal McGuckian Consultants for Agriculture Victoria, Department of Natural Resources 
and Environment (1996). 
 
Panel B: Salinity Reduction 
Land Use or Management Change  Cost Range  Salt Reduction Range 
Wheat/Canola rotation phased with 
annual pasture changed to a 
wheat/canola rotation phased with 
Lucerne (shallow rooted) 
$123-152 per ha/year   24mm-33 mm per year 
Wheat/Canola rotation phased with 
annual pasture changed to continuous 
Lucerne (deep rooted) 
$202-221 per ha/year  36mm-44mm per year 
Wheat/Canola rotation phased with 
annual pasture changed to continuous 
kikuyu pasture 
$252-271 per ha/year  31mm-56mm per year 
Sources: Salt management options are obtained from, 'Quantitative Analysis of Benefits and Costs for Salinity 
Control', by Read-Sturgess Associates, 2000, a report for the National Land and Water Resources Audit, Theme 6, 
Project 3.3)   30
Table 2: Example Costs, Environmental Benefits and Offers for Two Sessions (period 31) 















Discriminative Price Auction             
31 1 blue 73.19  6120  7219  98.63 19     
31 1  red 124.46  2889  3988  32.04  1    Yes 
31 1  yellow  79.85  5377  6476  81.10 17     
31 2 blue 55.99  4818  4988  89.09 18     
31 2  red 153.41  9047  9247  60.28  9     
31 2  yellow  95.24  7265  7410  77.80 16     
31 3 blue 80.64  8698  9200  114.09 20     
31  3 red 68.07  3089  3900  57.29 8     
31 3  yellow 97.7 5960  6600  67.55 12     
31 4 blue 91.66  4901  6901  75.29 15     
31 4  red 111.26  5688  7600  68.31 13     
31 4  yellow  79.51  8772  11777  148.12 24     
31 5 blue  98.3 2848  3600  36.62  2    Yes 
31  5 red 85.86  2969  3500  40.76 3     
31 5  yellow  84.45  4687  5200  61.57 10     
31 6 blue  74.3 3287  4200  56.53  7    Yes 
31 6  red 153.19  9037  10000  65.28 11     
31 6  yellow  86.11  9380  10200  118.45 22     
31 7 blue  91.9 6117  6617  72.00 14     
31 7  red 126.03  6217  6717  53.30  6    Yes 
31 7  yellow  77.04  9689  10000  129.80 23     
31 8 blue 124.42  4859  6000  48.22  4    Yes 
31 8  red  53.34  4899  6200  116.24 21     
31 8  yellow  102.6  3691  5000  48.73  5     
Uniform Price Auction              
31 1 blue 73.19  6120  6255  85.46 19  49.33   
31 1  red 124.46  2889  2999  24.10  4  49.33 Yes 
31 1  yellow  79.85  5377  5888  73.74 18  49.33   
31 2 blue 55.99  4818  4100  73.23 17  49.33   
31 2  red 153.41  9047  8500  55.41 12  49.33   
31 2  yellow  95.24  7265  6500  68.25 16  49.33   
31 3 blue 80.64  8698  8698  107.86 21  49.33   
31  3 red 68.07  3089  3090  45.39 8  49.33 Yes 
31 3  yellow 97.7 5960  6500  66.53 14  49.33   
31 4 blue 91.66  4901  4901  53.47 11  49.33   
31 4  red 111.26  5688  5688  51.12 10  49.33   
31 4  yellow  79.51  8772  8772  110.33 23  49.33   
31 5 blue  98.3 2848  1500  15.26  2  49.33 Yes 
31  5 red 85.86  2969  1600  18.63 3  49.33   
31 5  yellow  84.45  4687  2500  29.60  5  49.33   
31 6 blue  74.3 3287  3300  44.41  7  49.33 Yes 
31 6  red 153.19  9037  9050  59.08 13  49.33   
31 6  yellow  86.11  9380  9400  109.16 22  49.33   
31 7 blue  91.9 6117  6117  66.56 15  49.33   
31 7  red 126.03  6217  6217  49.33  9  49.33   
31 7  yellow  77.04  9689  9689  125.77 24  49.33   
31 8 blue 124.42  4859  4200  33.76  6  49.33   
31 8  red  53.34  4899  5000  93.74 20  49.33   
31 8  yellow  102.6  3691  1 0.01  1  49.33 Yes   31
Table 3: Overall Performance by Session 














Nitrogen Reduction Environment 
  82.8% 69.4% 86.5% 81.6%  4722  6723 
Ten  85.2% 72.6% 90.3% 82.1%  3923  6682 
Individual  84.3% 72.4% 88.6% 83.1%  4383  6528 
Sessions 80.8% 74.2% 86.9% 84.9%  4840  5467 
in  Each  88.6% 69.6% 94.6% 77.4%  2501  7828 
Treatment  90.7% 70.4% 97.0% 79.9%  2108  7242 
  88.8% 71.1% 95.5% 80.8%  2387  6593 
  88.8% 71.7% 94.6% 80.5%  2555  6962 
  88.4% 73.4% 94.4% 82.8%  2527  6098 
  88.4% 67.2% 94.4% 80.2%  2932  5952 
Treatment 
Mean  86.7% 71.2% 92.3% 81.3%  3288  6608 
Salt Reduction Environment 
89.0% 84.6% 94.8% 91.3%  59.4  95.6 
89.5% 85.4% 94.3% 92.7%  68.7  78.2 
89.4% 83.2% 94.4% 90.2%  67.9  107.1 





Treatment  88.3% 84.7% 94.4% 91.2%  60.5  96.2 
Treatment 
Mean    89.1% 84.2% 94.5% 91.4%  63.7  93.1 
   32
Table 4: Regression Models for Market Performance Measures 












Nitrogen Reduction Environment 






























Observations 694  694  694 
R-squared 0.57  0.38  0.41 
Salt Reduction Environment 































Observations 358  358  358 
R-squared 0.26  0.37  0.28 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 1-percent. *: denotes a 
coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 10-percent.  
All models are estimated with a random effects error structure, with the session as the random 
effect. Exception is the P-MAR model for salt reduction, for which the random effects model did 
not converge. We hence report OLS estimates for this model.   33















Nitrogen Reduction Environment 













2  - 0.0000070 
(0.0000046) 
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R-squared 0.58  0.58  0.29 
Number of 
Observations 
8621 8621  8610 














2 -  0.0000091 
(0.00017) 
- 















R-squared  0.86 0.86  0.70 
Number of 
Observations 
    
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 1-percent. *: denotes a 
coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 10-percent. 
All models are estimated with a random effects error structure, with the subject as the random 
effect. Figure 1:



















Fitted (Quadratic) Offer Function
Risk Neutral Offer for N=8, Q=5 Approximation BenchmarkFigure 2:













































































































































































































































Discriminative PriceFigure 6: Median Offers and Prices Paid















Median Offer Median Accepted Offer Median Price Paid
Discriminative Price Auction
Uniform Price Auction












Median Offer Median Accepted Offer Median Price Paid
Discriminative Price Auction
Uniform Price Auction1. Introduction 
Auctions are commonly used to allocate scarce resources. Recent applications of 
economic theory and experimental economics to auction design have substantially improved the 
performance of auctions and have also helped to expand their applications to a broad range of 
problems. One area where auctions have attracted attention is in allocating resources to protect 
the environment. Many environmental problems stem from agricultural land management 
practices. These include rising salt and nutrient levels in rivers and bays, wetlands degradation, 
destruction of remnant vegetation and dryland salinity.  These pollution problems cause a decline 
in pasture and crop productivity, stunted growth and decreased plant yields. Extreme salinity can 
leave soil barren, for example, supporting only isolated patches of the most salt tolerant plants. 
Non-point sources in agriculture generate a substantial fraction of certain types of pollution, and 
it is difficult or prohibitively expensive to identify the amount and the source of many of these 
non-point emissions. Landowners have more information than regulators about their production 
plans and their costs of reducing pollution. An incentive mechanism like an auction is well suited 
to address this information asymmetry and encourage different landowners to reveal their private 
opportunity cost of land management changes. This could help the regulator to identify the land 
use options with greater environmental benefit but lower opportunity cost. 
  The theoretical advantages of auctions to mitigate environmental problems are well 
recognized (e.g., Latacz-Lohmann and Hamsvoort, 1997). However, using auctions to solve 
environmental problems in practice requires more empirical research. In this paper we use 
experimental methods to examine two kinds of auction designs for “environmental 
procurement:” uniform price auctions and discriminative price auctions. Landowners offer 
projects that generate environmental improvement in these auctions. More specifically, sellers   2
offer projects with different costs and different levels of environmental benefits to the regulator, 
who is the buyer and ranks the offers on the basis of their offer price and the potential 
environmental improvement. The regulator allocates a fixed monetary budget to buy a maximum 
of one project from each seller. Each project is a specific land use change. All participants 
submit sealed offers, and in the uniform price auction the successful sellers receive a uniform 
price (per unit of environmental benefit) equal to the lowest rejected offer. In the discriminative 
price auction, each successful seller receives the actual price offered, rather than a single price 
common to all sellers.  
In the discriminative price design the sellers face uncertainty about acceptance, but not 
about price, since the price obtained from the regulator equals the offer if the offer is accepted. 
When contemplating raising her offer, a seller trades off the decreased probability of acceptance 
against a higher trading surplus conditional on acceptance. She has an incentive to misrepresent 
her costs and submit offers higher than her true reservation values, because otherwise she would 
earn no trading surplus.  
By contrast, in the uniform price auction all the successful sellers receive a market-
clearing price that exceeds their offer and is set by a seller who does not trade. In these auctions 
each seller has a greater incentive to reveal her true costs, since submitting an offer greater than 
the cost of a unit lowers the probability of selling that unit but does not raise the price at which 
the item might be sold. We find that offers are substantially closer to costs in the uniform price 
auction compared to the discriminative price auction. Nevertheless, for the experimental 
parameters we employ, the overall performance of the discriminative price auction is superior. 
  Formal analysis of these types of sealed bid auctions dates back to Vickrey (1961), who 
compared the incentives resulting from different auction procedures. He obtained a seminal   3
revenue equivalence theorem, which states that under the assumptions of bidder risk neutrality, 
independent private valuations, symmetry among buyers, single unit demand, payments a 
function of bids only and zero transaction costs incurred in bid creation and implementation, 
different auction formats yield the same expected revenue to the auctioneer. Much of the 
theoretical literature following Vickrey examines the robustness of this result to the introduction 
of alternative assumptions about buyers and sellers.
1 Empirical research comparing uniform and 
discriminative price auctions has used both field data and data from laboratory experiments. 
Kagel (1995) provides a survey of the early auction research. Smith (1982) reports the results of 
a number of experiments for multi-unit auctions in which the bidders submit single unit bids. The 
results neither support nor refute the revenue equivalence theorem. Cox et al. (1985) find that 
subjects failed to follow their dominant strategy of bidding equal to values in multiple unit, 
uniform price, sealed bid auctions. Cox et al. (1982) and Kagel et al. (1987) provide laboratory 
evidence that subjects respond strategically to the different incentives that alternative auction 
formats generate. Tenorio (1993) uses data from the Zambian foreign exchange auction to 
analyze the effects of a change in auction format from uniform price to discriminative price and 
finds that after controlling for other factors, the uniform price format yields higher average 
revenue than the discriminative price format. Umlauf (1993) reports similar results for auctions 
undertaken by the Mexican treasury.  
  Theoretical research on auctions cannot be directly applied to the auctions in this 
environmental application, however, because environmental goods and services violate many of 
                                                 
1 For example, Holt (1980) shows that for risk averse buyers, the discriminative auction results in higher expected 
revenue, and Maskin and Riley (2000) relax the assumption of symmetry and assume that the buyers’ reservation 
values are not identically distributed. In this case the revenue equivalence theorem does not hold and the ranking of 
different auctions would depend on how the distributions vary across buyers. Some researchers have argued that the 
uniform price auction has a lower winner’s curse in common value environments and results in greater revenue to 
the seller than would a discriminative auction (see Milgrom, 1989; Bikhchandani and Huang, 1993). However this 
work was based on a single-unit auction theory and Back and Zender (1993) show that this result is critically 
dependent on the assumption that the good was indivisible.    4
the assumptions for the revenue equivalence theorem. For example, the auctions studied here 
assume that sellers offer multiple projects for sale, but because of the interaction of the 
environmental benefits across projects the regulator would choose at most one project from each 
seller.
2 In this setting, sellers may not make optimal offers independently on each project. Instead 
they could infer that certain projects have a higher potential probability of winning and therefore 
they might focus their efforts on obtaining profits on these projects. Since they know that the 
regulator will purchase at most one project from each seller, they could make less aggressive 
offers on their other projects so as to avoid competing with themselves across projects. 
Moreover, the fixed budget constraint for the regulator implies that the number of projects 
accepted is endogenous. Hence our environment is not consistent with any particular existing 
theoretical model, and it is unlikely that any new tractable theory could capture these 
complications that arise in most relevant field applications. 
  Fortunately, in spite of these realistic complications it is feasible to compare the two 
auction institutions empirically even though a theoretical comparison is not practical. In our 
laboratory testbed we compare the behavior and performance of these two auction institutions in 
two different controlled environments. Our results show that laboratory subjects understand the 
cost revelation incentives of the uniform price auctions, with most submitted offers near the 
actual costs. By contrast, in the discriminative price auction almost all offers are greater than 
cost. For the parameters we employ, however, the discriminative price auctions result in more 
efficient environmental protection than the uniform price auctions. All three performance 
indicators show that the discriminative price design leads to significantly greater overall 
                                                 
2 For example, the installation of grassed swale drains with sediment traps to reduce nutrient loads would reduce the 
environmental benefit of decreased fertilizer applications. The benefits of these two alternative mitigation strategies 
are therefore interrelated, but the benefits would be evaluated separately in the auction for simplicity. To avoid the 
complication of project interactions we limit each seller to supply at most one project.   5
performance, even though the discriminative auction rules lead to higher offer prices. The 
empirical research issues examined in this paper are crucial to understand better how these 
environmental auctions might perform in the field. The experiments are based on parameters 
calibrated to field applications for actual environmental problems, so we think they can provide 
valuable guidance in economic settings like these where theoretical research cannot give clear 
predictions and hence is of limited use to make institutional comparisons.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design 
and Section 3 presents the results. Section 4 concludes with a brief discussion of the findings. 
  
2. Experimental Design 
2.1  Environment and Procedures 
As discussed above, the revenue equivalence theorem does not apply in this environment, 
so it is possible that the relative efficiency and performance of the two auction institutions might 
be sensitive to the specific parameters chosen for the laboratory testbed. This potential parameter 
sensitivity is not uncommon in laboratory research, but it is more relevant here because we wish 
to strengthen the external validity of our results for potential field applications. We therefore 
employ parameters that correspond to two different non point source pollution problems: 
nitrogen reduction and salt reduction. The costs and environmental benefits are estimated 
specifically for these two environmental applications. In particular, in the nitrogen reduction 
environment, we employ cost and quality parameters representing the estimated opportunities for 
environmental improvement through land use change in the Port Phillip watershed, in southern 
Victoria, Australia (also see Cason, Gangadharan and Duke, 2003). All subjects have their costs 
and quality drawn from broadacre (field cropping) and grazing land uses, which are the activities   6
that represent the largest land use in the watershed (57 percent of the land) and contributes to 53 
percent of annual nitrogen pollution.  In the salinity reduction environment, the costs of salt 
management options and the associated environmental benefits were obtained from the 
Kamarook Catchment in Victoria, Australia (Hekmeijer et al., 2000). 
Subjects make offers based on different costs and qualities to represent the heterogeneity 
across different activities on the same land and between the same activities on different plots of 
land. We introduce heterogeneity by drawing costs and environmental quality for each land use 
change independently for each seller, each period, from the uniform distributions based on the 
ranges shown in Table 1.
3 We use the same sequence of drawn values in all the sessions to 
minimize across session variation and to improve the power of our comparison across auction 
institution treatments. Sellers know the costs of their land use change projects, but they do not 
know the associated quality (environmental benefit). We do not reveal the environmental 
benefits to sellers because a primary conclusion of Cason, Gangadharan and Duke (2003) was 
that this information led sellers to misrepresent their costs more for high-benefit projects, and 
this reduced total abatement and lowered other performance characteristics of the auction. In 
order to enhance the external validity of the experiment, we also do not provide sellers with any 
information about other sellers’ costs and quality or the distributions that are used to generate the 
costs and qualities. They are told simply that the costs and quality levels would be different 
across sellers and could change from period to period. They also do not know the regulator’s 
budget, which is fixed at $25,000 experimental dollars per period in the nitrogen reduction 
environment and $1000 experimental dollars per period in the salt reduction environment. 
                                                 
3 The benefit ranges shown in Table 1 represent the best available estimates given the soil type and topography of 
the Port Phillip watershed and the Kamarook Catchment. The cost ranges were developed through consultation with 
private landholders. For additional details on costs and benefits for nitrogen reduction, see Cason, Gangadharan and 
Duke (2003).   7
Subjects are informed that the experimenter purchases the lowest priced items per unit of quality, 
spending the fixed budget in each period. At the end of each auction period sellers only learned 
which item (if any) they sold and the price they received.  
Experimental subjects are undergraduate students from Purdue University and the 
University of Melbourne. All participated in only one session reported here and had no previous 
experience in sealed offer auctions. We report 30 sessions, 15 conducted at Melbourne (8 in the 
uniform price format and 7 in the discriminative price format) and 15 conducted at Purdue (7 in 
the uniform price format and 8 in the discriminative price format). All sessions have 36 trading 
periods. In each session eight seller subjects offer items in a computerized sealed offer auction, 
so across all 30 sessions a total of 240 different subjects participated. Each auction period sellers 
can offer to sell three items that correspond to different land use changes and have different 
environmental benefits. Sellers submit offers using an electronic form on a web browser. After 
all offers are submitted, the server sorts the offers and ranks them on the basis of the offer price 
and the quality of the items (quality is the environmental benefit) and calculates the allocation 
for the period. The auctioneer buys the lowest-price projects per unit of quality, subject to the 
constraint that at most one item is bought from each seller and total auction expenditures are no 
greater than the auction budget. The two auction institutions differ only in how they determine 
trading prices; see Table 2 below for a specific example. Once the allocation is made the results 
are reported to the subjects electronically on their web browser.  
As is usual in experimental economics, we use neutral terminology in the instructions to 
refer to the different items that sellers could offer. The appendix contains the experiment 
instructions. Subjects are asked to record the profits made in each of the 36 periods in their 
record sheets and they are paid privately in cash after the experiment. The conversion rate used   8
in the nitrogen reduction environment for the Purdue sessions was 1000 experimental dollars = 1 
U.S. dollar and the conversion rate used in Melbourne was 600 experimental dollars = 1 
Australian dollar. For the salinity reduction sessions the corresponding conversion rates were 15 
experimental dollars = 1 U.S. dollar and 12 experimental dollars = 1 Australian dollar. Sessions 
typically lasted 60 to 90 minutes, including the instruction time. Average subject earnings were 
about US$23 each in the Purdue sessions and A$30 each in the Melbourne sessions.  
2.2  Treatments and Predictions 
  Our goal in this experiment is to compare the performance characteristics of uniform 
price and discriminative price auctions. In the uniform price treatment if sellers sell an item they 
receive a price that is greater than or equal to their offer price. The uniform price in the market is 
determined by the lowest price per unit of quality submitted by a seller who had all of his or her 
offers rejected. In the discriminative price treatment sellers receive their exact offer price when 
they sell an item. Both auctions employ the greedy algorithm that finds the best local solution by 
accepting the items that have the lowest price per unit of quality, subject to the other constraints 
that (1) no more than one item is purchased from each seller and that (2) total expenditures do 
not exceed the overall auction budget.
4 
  Table 2 presents an example from period 31 in two sessions to illustrate the rules. In both 
auction formats the algorithm first calculates ratio of the offer price to the environmental benefit 
for each project, and then prioritizes projects according to this ratio from lowest to highest. The 
top panel of Table 2 shows this ranking and allocation for a discriminative price session. The 
first and second projects in this ranking are sold, but the third is not because the algorithm 
already bought a project from seller 5. The auction only purchases five projects because the 
                                                 
4 We could have implemented a more complex algorithm that is more likely to find the globally optimal solution, 
but at the cost of not being able to explain the auction purchase rule to sellers. We chose this simple algorithm since 
our goal is to study auction rules that could be implemented in the field with a reasonable level of transparency.   9
cumulative cost is $24,505 and no additional projects can be purchased with the $495 remaining 
in the auction budget. The bottom panel of Table 2 shows results in a uniform price session. 
Again, only five projects are sold. All are sold at the offer/benefit ratio of a seller (7) who 
submitted the lowest ratio (49.33) but had all of her offers rejected. For example, instead of his 
red-unit offer of 2999, seller 1 received 49.33 times his environmental benefit (124.46) = $6,140 
for this project. Total auction expenditures are $23,073 this period. 
  The standard revenue equivalence results do not apply in these auctions since sellers have 
multiple items to offer, they do not observe the quantity of environmental benefits for their 
items, the number of items purchased is endogenous since it is based on an overall auction 
budget, not to mention other practical reasons equivalence results often do not apply such as risk 
aversion and bounded rationality. Our focus is therefore not on comparing the outcomes of these 
auctions to theoretical predictions, but we can nevertheless compare the relative empirical 
performance of the two auction institutions for different environmental management 
applications. Still, it is useful to have some theoretical benchmarks based on simplifying 
assumptions to motivate the institutional comparison. 
  The most reasonable benchmark for the uniform price auction is full revelation: 
offer=cost. In this type of “first-rejected-offer” uniform price auction sellers usually have a 
dominant strategy to offer their projects at cost. This is because submitting an offer below cost 
would only increase the probability of acceptance if the price received falls below cost, and 
submitting an offer above cost is very unlikely to raise the price.
5 For the auction budgets and the 
                                                 
5 An offer above cost could occasionally raise price in our setting because sellers’ different projects have different 
environmental benefits and the auction has a monetary budget constraint. It is therefore possible to construct 
examples in which a seller could raise the offer price on one of her items above cost and have a different (higher 
environmental benefit) item accepted, which would in turn exclude different rivals’ items and raise the uniform 
cutoff price. Sellers do not observe their projects’ environmental benefits, nor do they observe the offers or costs of 
their rivals; therefore, the incomplete information setting of our experiment—chosen to reflect reasonable   10
actual realized costs and environmental benefits draws employed in the experiment, under full 
cost revelation these uniform price auction rules extract 72.4 percent of the maximum possible 
abatement in the nitrogen reduction environment and 86.6 percent of the maximum possible 
abatement in the salinity reduction environment. 
  Sellers’ costs are distributed independently in this laboratory environment, so 
independent private value auction theory for multiple-unit discriminative price auctions provides 
a benchmark approximation in the discriminative price auction treatment. Since sellers receive 
the price they offer, they clearly have an incentive to offer prices above costs. How much above 
costs they should offer depends on the number of sellers in the auction and the number of units 
accepted by the auctioneer. Our experiments employed N=8 sellers, and the sellers could infer 
over time from the rate that they successfully sold that typically the auctioneer purchased Q=5 
units each period in the nitrogen environment, or Q=5 or Q=6 units each period in the salinity 
reduction environment.
6 If, as a first approximation, sellers behave as if they know Q and that it 
is stable, and they prepare offers on each of their three units independently, we can estimate how 
much they will offer above cost based on standard results from Vickrey auctions (see, e.g., Cox, 
Smith and Walker, (1984), for the relevant formula). As shown below in Figure 1, the 
equilibrium offer function under these simplifying assumptions is nonlinear and substantially 
exceeds cost for low cost draws. For our parameters the equilibrium offers for the low-range cost 
draws are two or three times higher than cost based on this approximation. Consequently, for the 
actual realized cost and environmental benefits draws employed in the experiment, in the 
nitrogen reduction environment these discriminative price auction rules extract only 54.8 percent 
                                                                                                                                                             
incomplete information in any field implementation—makes the identification of this misrepresentation incentive 
rather implausible. 
6 In the nitrogen reduction environment, exactly Q=5 units were sold in 64 percent of the periods, and the Q sold 
was 4, 5 or 6 in 99 percent of the periods. In the salinity reduction environment, Q=4 in 6.2% of the periods, Q=5 in 
42.1% of the periods and Q=6 in 51.7% of the periods.   11
of the maximum possible abatement if this offer function approximation is accurate. The 
corresponding benchmark for the salinity reduction environment is 63 percent of the maximum 
possible abatement for both the Q=5 and Q=6 approximations. These benchmarks are 
substantially below the benchmark prediction for the uniform price auction (72.4 percent and 
86.6 percent respectively for nitrogen and salinity as noted above), so we expect that uniform 




  Figures 1 and 2 present an overview of the offer data for the nitrogen reduction 
environment.
7 Figure 1 indicates that nearly all offers (99%) exceed cost as expected in the 
discriminative price auction. Most offers (73%) lie in a band between cost and cost+$1000, and 
45% are within $500 of cost. The offer data for the salinity reduction environment are similar; 
99.6% of the offers exceed costs and most offers (89%) lie in a band between cost and cost+$28, 
and 58% are within $14 of cost.  Figure 2 shows that offers are dramatically different in the 
uniform price auction. The scatterplot of offers is more centered on the offer=cost reference line 
(indeed, the offer dots practically obscure this line). While there is some variation in offers 
relative to costs and nearly two-thirds (64%) of the offers are above cost, 80% of the offers are 
within $500 of cost. Similarly for the salinity reduction environment, nearly two thirds (67%) of 
the offers are above cost and 85% of the offers are within $14 of cost. In the first subsection we 
                                                 
7 This figure, and all the analysis that follows in this section, excludes a small number of offers that were obvious 
typographical errors. These occurred when sellers accidentally left a digit off of their offer, such as making an offer 
of 1,030 with a cost of 9,250 in the discriminative price treatment. This seller clearly intended a different offer (such 
as 10,300) since the offer of 1,030 virtually guarantees her a loss of 8,220, and this occurred in period 35 when this 
seller had plenty of experience. We excluded a total of 27 such typographical errors, out of 25,896 offers submitted 
(0.10%). We also lost all 24 offers from one period in one uniform price session due to a data recording error.   12
summarize the impact of the auction rules and these offers on overall market performance, 
before we return to analyze the offer behavior in more detail in Subsection 3.2. 
3.1  Overall Market Performance 
Following Cason et al. (2003), we compare the auction formats using three market 
performance measures. These measures differ from the standard allocative efficiency measures 
typically applied in laboratory auction research. For the auction to be allocatively efficient, it 
must select the least costly projects. But in this policy application, to improve efficiency the 
auction also needs to select projects with high environmental benefits (quality). The first market 
performance measure, called P-MAR (for the Percentage of Maximum Abatement Realized), is 
the amount of pollution abatement realized by the auction mechanism, as a percentage of the 
highest amount of abatement that could be achieved with the government’s auction budget. This 
maximum is based on the realized cost and benefit draws each period. This maximum abatement 
target could be achieved, for example, if the government knew both the cost and quality of each 
project and could implement its selected projects at their cost.
8  
Figure 3 shows that average P-MAR is greater in the discriminative price auction than in 
the uniform price auction in all 36 periods of the nitrogen reduction environment and in 31 of 36 
periods in the salinity environment. The left side of Table 3 presents P-MAR averaged across 
                                                 
8 Sometimes this maximum abatement would occur in the discriminative price auction if all sellers offer their 
projects in the auction at cost. Cost-revealing seller behavior does not always result in maximum abatement, 
however. The auction ranks the offers on the basis of their offer/quality ratio, and selects those with the lowest 
ratios. This greedy algorithm does not always result in the maximum abatement achievable for a fixed budget, due to 
the discrete set of projects acceptable in any auction period. Some higher abatement projects could be excluded from 
the auction allocation due to a cost that exceeds the fixed budget, while higher offer/quality ranking projects are 
accepted because of their lower overall cost. Consequently, some rearrangement of the selected projects can 
sometimes modestly increase the total abatement realized. To determine the selected projects that maximize 
pollution abatement, we calculated the total abatement for the 4
8=65,536 possible project combinations each period, 
and determined the greatest abatement among all the affordable project combinations. If all sellers offered their 
projects at cost, then the discriminative price auction selects the combination of projects that maximize abatement in 
12 of the 36 periods in the nitrogen reduction environment and in 6 of the 36 periods in the salinity reduction 
environment. In 28 of the 36 periods for the nitrogen environment and in 19 of the 36 periods for the salinity 
environment, full cost revelation achieves at least 95 percent of the maximum possible abatement.   13
periods, separately for each session. The lowest efficiency across the 10 discriminative price 
sessions (80.8%) is greater than the highest efficiency across the 10 uniform price sessions 
(74.2%) in the nitrogen reduction environment, so a nonparametric Wilcoxon test based on one 
(statistically independent) observation per session strongly rejects the hypothesis of equal 
efficiencies (p-value=0.0014). Similarly for the salinity reduction environment, the lowest 
efficiency across the 5 discriminative price sessions (88.3%) is greater than the highest efficiency 
in the uniform price treatment (85.4%) so the Wilcoxon test rejects the hypothesis of equal 
efficiencies (p-value=0.03). 
The regression shown in the first column of Table 4 presents additional parametric 
evidence that controls for other factors such as experience (time period) and subject pool. These 
panel regressions are based on a random effects error structure, with the session representing the 
random effect, in order to account for the correlation of market outcomes within a session. We 
include a dummy variable for the experiment site to account for any cultural or demographic 
differences across subjects. We also include ln(period) to allow the model to capture differences 
in performance across periods. The negative and highly significant estimate on the uniform price 
treatment dummy variable indicates that P-MAR efficiency is about 15 percentage points lower 
in the uniform price auction than in the discriminative price auction in the nitrogen reduction 
environment. The difference between the pricing rules leads to a smaller difference in 
performance for the salinity reduction environment, but the pricing rule is still statistically highly 
significant. Although Figure 3 does not indicate any pronounced trend over time, the positive and 
significant ln(period) term indicates that performance improves modestly across periods in both 
environments.   14
  The second market performance measure provides an alternative summary of the 
auctions’ ability to obtain the most abatement for the auction budget. We use P-OCER (for the 
Percentage of Optimal Cost-Effectiveness Realized) to refer to the actual quantity of abatement 
per dollar spent in the auction, as a percentage of the quantity of abatement per dollar spent in 
the “maximal abatement” solution to this problem described above. It differs from P-MAR 
because different amounts are spent in this auction since the auction selects a discrete set of 
projects. Presumably the unspent resources have some alternative value, so a reasonable 
objective is to maximize the abatement per dollar.  
  Figure 4 and the middle of Table 3 show that P-OCER, like P-MAR, is uniformly higher 
in the discriminative price auction than in the uniform price auction (Wilcoxon p-value=0.0014 
in the nitrogen reduction environment and 0.03 in the salt reduction environment). The 
regression in the second column of Table 4 indicates that P-OCER efficiency is on average about 
11 percentage points higher in the discriminative price auction in the nitrogen reduction 
environment and 3 percentage points higher in the salinity reduction environment. The positive 
and significant ln(period) term indicates that like P-MAR, P-OCER increases across time. 
  The third performance measure is seller profits. Seller profits represent money “left on 
the table” that the government “overspends,” relative to the actual cost of implementing the land 
use changes. Therefore, lower seller profits are better from the government’s perspective.  
  Figure 5 shows that sellers almost always earn higher profits on average in the uniform 
price auction, and in some periods their earnings are dramatically higher—even double the 
profits of the discriminative price auction. The right side of Table 3 shows that similar to the 
efficiency calculations, in the nitrogen reduction environment the highest average seller profits in 
the discriminative price auction (4840) is less than the lowest seller profits in the uniform price   15
auction (5467), so the Wilcoxon test also strongly rejects the hypothesis of equal seller profits 
across auction treatments (p-value=0.0014). Similarly for the salinity reduction environment, the 
highest average seller profits in the discriminative price auction (68.7) is less than the lowest 
seller profits in the uniform price auction (78.2) and the Wilcoxon test rejects the hypothesis of 
equal seller profits across treatments (p-value=0.03). The seller profits regression model in the 
third column of Table 4 also mirrors those of the abatement efficiency models. Seller profits are 
significantly higher in the uniform price auction, by over 3,000 experimental dollars per period 
on average in the nitrogen reduction environment and by nearly 29 experimental dollars in the 
salinity reduction environment. These average differences in profits across auction institutions 
represent approximately 80 percent and 20 percent of the cost of the median accepted offer in the 
nitrogen and the salinity reduction environments, respectively. Overall, the results in Figures 3 
through 5 and Tables 3 and 4 indicate that market performance is lower in the uniform price 
auction.  
3.2  Offer Behavior 
In this section we examine the individual offers made by sellers by estimating empirical 
offer functions that relate offers to cost draws. First, however, recall that our design employed 
the same set of cost draws across all 20 sessions in the nitrogen reduction environment and 
across all 10 sessions in the salinity reduction environment i.e., we use the same set of 8 sellers × 
3 items × 36 periods = 864 cost draws in each session, with separate draws of course for the 
nitrogen and salinity environments. Thus, we can pair the same cost draws for each of the 10 
pairs of sessions in the nitrogen reduction environment and in each of the 5 pairs of sessions in 
the salinity reduction application and compare the corresponding offers across auction 
treatments. This simple and direct comparison between the offers indicates that offers are on   16
average 572 experimental dollars higher in the discriminative price session (standard error of the 
mean = 43) for the nitrogen reduction environment and 14.3 experimental dollars higher in the 
discriminative price session (standard error of the mean = 0.59) for the salinity reduction 
environment. The average number of units bought by the regulator in the uniform price sessions 
is lower than in the discriminative price sessions, but the difference is statistically significant 
only for the nitrogen reduction environment. The median variance of offers is also higher in the 
uniform price sessions, however the difference is not statistically significant in either 
environment.  
Table 5 presents random effects regressions of seller offer functions separately for the 
two auction treatments. Columns 1 and 2 report the results for the discriminative price treatment 
and column 3 presents the estimates for the uniform price treatment. The dependent variable is 
the seller’s offer price, and the explanatory variables include costs faced by sellers for the 
different projects, a dummy variable for the site of the experiment, and time (the natural 
logarithm of the period number). We report both linear and nonlinear specifications for the 
discriminative price treatment, since the theoretical approximation in Figure 1 suggests a 
nonlinear specification for this institution.
9 Note, however, that the nonlinear term (costs
2) is not 
significantly different from zero for either environment. 
The results show that there is a strong positive relationship between the project cost and 
the offers in both the uniform and discriminative price treatments. In fact, the coefficient on the 
cost variable is not significantly different from one for either auction format in either 
environment, indicating a similar one-to-one relationship between costs and offers in both 
treatments. These estimated offer functions instead differ in their intercepts. In the nitrogen 
                                                 
9 In particular, the theoretical approximation shown in Figure 1 for the nitrogen reduction environment is fit very 
accurately with the quadratic specification Offer = 7573 – 0.429Cost + 0.000067Cost
2.   17
reduction environment, the intercept in the uniform price auction is not significantly different 
from zero, so combined with the cost coefficient not different from one these estimates support 
the conclusion that sellers on average made offers equal to cost. That is, sellers’ behavior on 
average is consistent with the revelation incentives for this auction institution discussed at the 
end of Section 2. By contrast, the intercept in the discriminative price auction is significantly 
greater than zero. The estimate indicates that offers were on average at least 1,000 experimental 
dollars above cost. For the salinity reduction environment, the offer function intercept is 
significantly positive for both uniform and discriminatory price sessions; however, offers 
increase over time in the discriminatory price sessions while they decline over time in the 
uniform price sessions. In the uniform price treatment this substantial time trend cancels out the 
positive intercept by period 16.   
Figure 1 displays a quadratic offer function fit through all the offers in the discriminatory 
price treatment, and it shows that on average the relationship between offers and costs is 
approximately linear. More importantly, this figure illustrates that sellers of low-cost projects in 
this incomplete information environment did not overstate their costs when submitting offers 
nearly as much as predicted by our benchmark approximation indicated on the figure. These low-
cost projects are particularly important for the overall efficiency and abatement realized in the 
auction, since they are most likely to be accepted by the auctioneer. Sellers offered these projects 
at prices closer to costs than we predicted, which is why the discriminative price auction 
performed better than the uniform price auction.  
The other reason for the performance difference is that the quantity of projects accepted 
in the two auctions is significantly different. Figure 6 shows that the median prices paid per 
project are higher in the uniform price treatment than in the discriminative price treatment even   18
though the median offers submitted by the sellers and the median accepted offers are lower in the 
uniform price sessions. This implies that the buyer operating with a fixed budget can buy more 
environmental projects on average in the discriminative price auction and this in turn leads to 
lower efficiency in the uniform price sessions. For example, in the nitrogen reduction 
environment 4.15 projects were bought on average in each uniform price auction, compared to 
5.06 projects on average in each discriminative price auction. 
  
4.   Discussion 
Auctions allow an environmental regulator and  landholders to use information about 
environmental benefits and land use management costs to help protect the environment. In the 
auctions testbedded here the agency uses public resources to subsidize land use changes that aim 
to reduce pollution. It is important therefore to ensure that the agency’s environmental budget is 
well spent, and this is where the details for the actual design of the auction become critical. 
The laboratory auctions reported in this paper compare uniform price allocation rules 
with discriminative price rules. The experiment makes this comparison in two different 
environmental applications—nitrogen reduction and salinity reduction. The offer function 
estimates indicate that offers were not significantly different from costs in the uniform price 
treatment, so sellers on average made offers in this auction format that were consistent with the 
cost-revelation incentives of this institution. Nevertheless, this auction format does not achieve 
full efficiency, since the uniform price was set by the first rejected seller’s offer, and all 
successful sellers received this price per unit of quality. Since successful sellers receive prices 
that exceed their offers and offers were approximately equal to costs, prices exceed costs and 
some inefficiency occurred.   19
The offer function estimates indicate that offers substantially exceed costs in the 
discriminative price treatment, and that each increase in costs by one dollar is matched with an 
increase in the offer by one dollar. Prices are set equal to offers, so submitting offers above costs 
is the only way that sellers can earn positive profits in this auction institution. This auction is also 
not fully efficient, but the results indicate that the inefficiency and the amount sellers are 
“overpaid” relative to their project costs is lower in the discriminative price auction than the 
uniform price auction. This occurred because sellers did not “mark up” offers above cost as 
much as suggested by an approximation based on multi-unit discriminative auction theory. In 
addition, the first rejected seller rule for setting the price in the uniform price auction leads to 
higher prices paid per project than in the discriminative price sessions, which in turn reduces the 
number of projects the environmental regulator can buy in the uniform price auction. This has an 
impact on reducing efficiency in the uniform price sessions. 
It is important to emphasize that these conclusions are based on particular 
parameterizations of project costs, land uses and potential environmental benefits. We chose 
these parameters carefully to approximate the conditions for two specific environmental 
problems being considered for land use change auctions, but these conclusions may not hold in 
other situations. For example, intuition from auction theory suggests that the degree to which 
sellers submit offers above cost in the discriminative price auction should depend on the number 
of sellers (N) relative to the number of items purchased (Q). Therefore, it is important to 
determine whether the ordering clearly established in this initial experiment continues to hold in 
other settings that approximate non-point source pollution in other regions and land uses. We 
should also emphasize that these laboratory testbed experiments represent only the first step in 
the long process from auction design to field implementation. For example, it will be useful to   20
conduct experiments with actual landholders, using the environmental terminology—and the 
relevant value judgments that environmental protection and property rights evoke in this 
population. The preferred auction design can then be evaluated in small-scale field experiments 
with landholders, implementing actual land use changes. The results reported here suggest that 
uniform price auction rules may not perform better than discriminative price rules, even though 
they have better cost-revelation incentives.   21
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Appendix: Instructions for Uniform Price Auction Treatment (Discriminative Price 
Auction instructions are similar) 
General 
  This is an experiment in the economics of decision making.  The instructions are simple 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you will earn money that will be paid 
to you privately in cash. All earnings on your computer screens are in Experimental Dollars. 
These Experimental Dollars will be converted to real Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a 
rate of             Experimental Dollars = 1 real Dollar. The important thing to remember is that the 
more experimental dollars you earn, the more real dollars that you take home at the end of the 
experiment. 
  We are going to conduct a set of auctions in which you will be a seller in a sequence of 
periods. During each auction period you will sell up to one item. You have up to three types of 
items to sell, called Blue, Red and Yellow items. These items have different levels of “quality” 
that are valued differently by the experimenter, who is the buyer. Your quality levels may change 
from period to period, and they may be different from the quality levels of other participants. 
You can sell only one item per period, and if you sell that item then you must pay that item’s 
cost. If you do not sell any item in a period then your earnings are zero for that period. Notice 
that you do not pay an item’s cost unless you sell that item. Your costs may also change from 
period to period, and they may be different from the costs of other participants. 
  Your costs for each of the three types of items are displayed on your computer screen 
each period, as shown in the example figure on the next page. The profits from sales (which are 
yours to keep) are computed by taking the difference between the sale price of an item and the 
cost of that item. (How price is determined will be explained shortly.) That is,   24
[your earnings = (sale price of item) – (cost of item)]. 
  Suppose, for example, that the cost for your Blue item is 110.  If you sell your Blue item 
at a price of 160, your earnings are: 
Earnings = 160 – 110 = 50 
Notice that if you sell an item for a price that is less than its cost, then you lose money on that 
sale. 
 
How Your Price is Determined 
  The price you receive if you sell an item and which (if any) item you sell is determined 
using a “sealed offer” auction. In each period you submit an “offer sheet” through your web 
browser, which lists the minimum amount that you wish to receive for each item. [Do not use a   25
dollar sign when entering your offers on your web browser.] If you sell an item, you will receive 
a price that is greater than or equal to the price you indicated on your offer sheet for that item.  
  After everyone submits their offer sheets, the experimenter’s computer then ranks the 
offers on the basis of the offer price and the quality of the items. The experimenter purchases the 
lowest priced items per unit of quality, spending all of the fixed and constant (and unknown to 
you) “budget” that is available in the auction.  (In the case of a “tie,” where two or more items 
are offered at the same per-quality-unit price but the experimenter cannot purchase them all, the 
computer randomly determines which item or items are purchased.) Sometimes you may sell an 
item that you offer at a higher price than some other item when that item has a higher quality. 
Sometimes you may not sell any item. Remember, the experimenter will buy no more than one 
item from each seller. 
  The price you receive if you sell an item is NOT determined by any of the offers you 
submit. Instead, everyone who sells an item in a period receives the same price per unit of 
quality, and this price is set by the lowest price per unit of quality submitted by a seller who had 
all of his or her offers REJECTED. Thus, your profit is not decreased by submitting offers lower 
than the lowest rejected offer that determines the price. The lower your offers the more likely 
you will have an offer below the lowest rejected offer and therefore make a successful sale.  
In other words, by submitting lower offers you increase the likelihood that you make a 
sale, but lower offers do not directly reduce the price you receive since the price you receive is 
determined by a different (rejected) seller’s offer. As long as you make offers that are no lower 
than your items’ costs, you have no chance of losing money because if you sell an item you 
receive a price that is at least as high as your offer price. But if you make offers that are lower 
than your costs you run the risk of selling at a price less than your cost. This is because the   26
lowest rejected offer could then also be less than your cost and result in a price for you that is 
less than your cost. 
 
After each auction period, the experimenter will tell you when to click the “Continue” 
button to display the auction results. An example results screen is shown above. It indicates 
which (if any) item you sell by a “yes” in the Sold column. The results screen also displays the 
price you receive and the profit on the sale. Circle the color of the one item (if any) that is 
accepted in the column (1) of your Personal Record Sheet. Then enter the cost of this item, your 
offer price, the price you receive for the item, and your profit in the other columns of the record 
sheet. Use a calculator to keep track of your total (cumulative) Experimental Dollar earnings in 
the rightmost column (6) of your Record Sheet. The results page will automatically increment 
the period number by 1 for the next period, so after you write down your results on your Record 
Sheet you should simply press Continue to move to the next period.   27
Summary 
•  Seller earnings on a sold item = sale price of item – cost of item 
•  Sellers have three types of items, which can have different costs and quality levels valued 
differently by the experimenter (who is the buyer). Your costs are shown on your computer 
screen each period.  
•  Costs and quality levels may change from period to period and vary across sellers. 
•  Sellers submit offer prices for three types of items, but the experimenter will buy no more 
than one item from each seller. 
•  The experimenter purchases the lowest price items per unit of quality, and spends a constant 
budget in every auction. 
•  If you sell an item the price you receive is determined by the lowest price per unit of quality 
offered by a seller who has all of his or her offers rejected in the auction. 
Are there any questions now before we begin the experiment?   28













for Sold Item 
(column 4) 
Profit this Period 





1  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
2  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
3  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
4  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
5  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
6  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
7  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
8  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
9  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
10  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
11  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
     
12  Blue  Red   
Yellow       None 
       29
Table 1:Cost and Environmental Benefit Quality: Parameters 
Note: Each of the eight sellers drew costs and benefits for three land use or management 
changes, one from each of the three categories indicated below. For the nitrogen reduction 
sessions, these costs and benefits were scaled up to correspond to 150 ha in land area per seller. 
We did not scale up the values for the salinity reduction sessions. 
 
Panel A: Nitrogen Reduction 
Land Use or Management Change  Cost Range  Nitrogen Reduction Range 
Filter/Buffer Strips  $15-65 per ha/year  0.35-0.875 kg/ha/year 
Stabilize Soil Erosion  $15-65 per ha/year  0.28-1.05 kg/ha/year 
Best Management Practices  $17.5-65 per ha/year  0.35-0.70 kg/ha/year 
Sources: Argent, R.M. and Mitchell, V.G. (1998) FILTER: A Nutrient Management Program for the Port Phillip 
Catchment. Centre for Environmental Applied Hydrology, The University of Melbourne. 
Documentation of “Best Management Practices” for Nutrient Reduction and Management in Dryland and Irrigated 
Agriculture, a report by Rendal McGuckian Consultants for Agriculture Victoria, Department of Natural Resources 
and Environment (1996). 
 
Panel B: Salinity Reduction 
Land Use or Management Change  Cost Range  Salt Reduction Range 
Wheat/Canola rotation phased with 
annual pasture changed to a 
wheat/canola rotation phased with 
Lucerne (shallow rooted) 
$123-152 per ha/year   24mm-33 mm per year 
Wheat/Canola rotation phased with 
annual pasture changed to continuous 
Lucerne (deep rooted) 
$202-221 per ha/year  36mm-44mm per year 
Wheat/Canola rotation phased with 
annual pasture changed to continuous 
kikuyu pasture 
$252-271 per ha/year  31mm-56mm per year 
Sources: Salt management options are obtained from, 'Quantitative Analysis of Benefits and Costs for Salinity 
Control', by Read-Sturgess Associates, 2000, a report for the National Land and Water Resources Audit, Theme 6, 
Project 3.3)   30
Table 2: Example Costs, Environmental Benefits and Offers for Two Sessions (period 31) 















Discriminative Price Auction             
31 1 blue 73.19  6120  7219  98.63 19     
31 1  red 124.46  2889  3988  32.04  1    Yes 
31 1  yellow  79.85  5377  6476  81.10 17     
31 2 blue 55.99  4818  4988  89.09 18     
31 2  red 153.41  9047  9247  60.28  9     
31 2  yellow  95.24  7265  7410  77.80 16     
31 3 blue 80.64  8698  9200  114.09 20     
31  3 red 68.07  3089  3900  57.29 8     
31 3  yellow 97.7 5960  6600  67.55 12     
31 4 blue 91.66  4901  6901  75.29 15     
31 4  red 111.26  5688  7600  68.31 13     
31 4  yellow  79.51  8772  11777  148.12 24     
31 5 blue  98.3 2848  3600  36.62  2    Yes 
31  5 red 85.86  2969  3500  40.76 3     
31 5  yellow  84.45  4687  5200  61.57 10     
31 6 blue  74.3 3287  4200  56.53  7    Yes 
31 6  red 153.19  9037  10000  65.28 11     
31 6  yellow  86.11  9380  10200  118.45 22     
31 7 blue  91.9 6117  6617  72.00 14     
31 7  red 126.03  6217  6717  53.30  6    Yes 
31 7  yellow  77.04  9689  10000  129.80 23     
31 8 blue 124.42  4859  6000  48.22  4    Yes 
31 8  red  53.34  4899  6200  116.24 21     
31 8  yellow  102.6  3691  5000  48.73  5     
Uniform Price Auction              
31 1 blue 73.19  6120  6255  85.46 19  49.33   
31 1  red 124.46  2889  2999  24.10  4  49.33 Yes 
31 1  yellow  79.85  5377  5888  73.74 18  49.33   
31 2 blue 55.99  4818  4100  73.23 17  49.33   
31 2  red 153.41  9047  8500  55.41 12  49.33   
31 2  yellow  95.24  7265  6500  68.25 16  49.33   
31 3 blue 80.64  8698  8698  107.86 21  49.33   
31  3 red 68.07  3089  3090  45.39 8  49.33 Yes 
31 3  yellow 97.7 5960  6500  66.53 14  49.33   
31 4 blue 91.66  4901  4901  53.47 11  49.33   
31 4  red 111.26  5688  5688  51.12 10  49.33   
31 4  yellow  79.51  8772  8772  110.33 23  49.33   
31 5 blue  98.3 2848  1500  15.26  2  49.33 Yes 
31  5 red 85.86  2969  1600  18.63 3  49.33   
31 5  yellow  84.45  4687  2500  29.60  5  49.33   
31 6 blue  74.3 3287  3300  44.41  7  49.33 Yes 
31 6  red 153.19  9037  9050  59.08 13  49.33   
31 6  yellow  86.11  9380  9400  109.16 22  49.33   
31 7 blue  91.9 6117  6117  66.56 15  49.33   
31 7  red 126.03  6217  6217  49.33  9  49.33   
31 7  yellow  77.04  9689  9689  125.77 24  49.33   
31 8 blue 124.42  4859  4200  33.76  6  49.33   
31 8  red  53.34  4899  5000  93.74 20  49.33   
31 8  yellow  102.6  3691  1 0.01  1  49.33 Yes   31
Table 3: Overall Performance by Session 














Nitrogen Reduction Environment 
  82.8% 69.4% 86.5% 81.6%  4722  6723 
Ten  85.2% 72.6% 90.3% 82.1%  3923  6682 
Individual  84.3% 72.4% 88.6% 83.1%  4383  6528 
Sessions 80.8% 74.2% 86.9% 84.9%  4840  5467 
in  Each  88.6% 69.6% 94.6% 77.4%  2501  7828 
Treatment  90.7% 70.4% 97.0% 79.9%  2108  7242 
  88.8% 71.1% 95.5% 80.8%  2387  6593 
  88.8% 71.7% 94.6% 80.5%  2555  6962 
  88.4% 73.4% 94.4% 82.8%  2527  6098 
  88.4% 67.2% 94.4% 80.2%  2932  5952 
Treatment 
Mean  86.7% 71.2% 92.3% 81.3%  3288  6608 
Salt Reduction Environment 
89.0% 84.6% 94.8% 91.3%  59.4  95.6 
89.5% 85.4% 94.3% 92.7%  68.7  78.2 
89.4% 83.2% 94.4% 90.2%  67.9  107.1 





Treatment  88.3% 84.7% 94.4% 91.2%  60.5  96.2 
Treatment 
Mean    89.1% 84.2% 94.5% 91.4%  63.7  93.1 
   32
Table 4: Regression Models for Market Performance Measures 












Nitrogen Reduction Environment 






























Observations 694  694  694 
R-squared 0.57  0.38  0.41 
Salt Reduction Environment 































Observations 358  358  358 
R-squared 0.26  0.37  0.28 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 1-percent. *: denotes a 
coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 10-percent.  
All models are estimated with a random effects error structure, with the session as the random 
effect. Exception is the P-MAR model for salt reduction, for which the random effects model did 
not converge. We hence report OLS estimates for this model.   33















Nitrogen Reduction Environment 













2  - 0.0000070 
(0.0000046) 
- 















R-squared 0.58  0.58  0.29 
Number of 
Observations 
8621 8621  8610 














2 -  0.0000091 
(0.00017) 
- 















R-squared  0.86 0.86  0.70 
Number of 
Observations 
    
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.  
***: denotes a coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 1-percent. *: denotes a 
coefficient that is significantly different from zero at 10-percent. 
All models are estimated with a random effects error structure, with the subject as the random 
effect. Figure 1:



















Fitted (Quadratic) Offer Function
Risk Neutral Offer for N=8, Q=5 Approximation BenchmarkFigure 2:













































































































































































































































Discriminative PriceFigure 6: Median Offers and Prices Paid















Median Offer Median Accepted Offer Median Price Paid
Discriminative Price Auction
Uniform Price Auction












Median Offer Median Accepted Offer Median Price Paid
Discriminative Price Auction
Uniform Price Auction